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Abstract
The presence of switching costs and persistent patient preferences generates demand inertia
and links current and future choices of hospital. Using a model of hospital competition with
demand inertia, we investigate the effect of patient expectations (whether and how patients
anticipate the future) on quality provision. We consider three types of expectations. Myopic
patients choose a hospital based on current variables alone, forward-looking but näıve patients
take the future into account but assume that quality remains constant, and forward-looking
and rational patients foresee the evolution of quality. We rank equilibrium quality provision
and show that it is higher under näıve than myopic expectations, while equilibrium quality
under rational expectations may be highest or lowest. This result also holds for patient welfare,
suggesting that rationality does not always benefit patients. We also show that only under
rational expectations may quality be lower than in a market without inertia and switching cost
reductions beneficial.
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1 Introduction
Motivated by the observation that patients tend to choose a hospital and repeatedly demand treat-
ment from it, even during unrelated episodes of care, recent empirical literature provides evidence of
demand inertia in hospital markets (Jung 2011; Shepard, 2016; Raval and Rosenbaum, 2018; Irace,
2018). Like travelling distance and quality of care, prior utilisation emerges as a key determinant
of hospital choice, and its effect has been shown to result both from persistent patient preferences
and from switching costs (Raval and Rosenbaum, 2018; Irace, 2018). Persistent preferences denote
the time-invariant horizontal preferences some patients have for hospital characteristics. Absent
significant changes in the market, and upon realising that their tastes or health needs have re-
mained constant, repeated utilisation of the same hospital may be the optimal behaviour for these
patients.
Preference persistency, however, does not fully explain the magnitude of demand inertia. Even
when their preferences change, patients may still find it optimal to choose the same hospital re-
peatedly if switching is costly, and there is a variety of reasons why switching costs arise in hospital
markets. First, there may be monetary and opportunity costs incurred by patients in order to have
their medical records transferred across providers. Second, because evaluating hospital quality is
a time-consuming and complex task, switching costs may reflect the risk of trying an untested,
alternative provider. Third, switching costs might arise from the need to undergo duplicate proce-
dures, such as diagnostic tests, when patients restart treatment after switching providers. Fourth,
switching costs may also be the premium patients are willing to pay, either in terms of higher prices
or lower quality, for familiarity with their chosen hospital. Switching costs, therefore, induce state
dependence; i.e., a causal impact of current on future choices. If switching is costly, choosing a
particular hospital in the present has an impact on the utility patients will derive from treatment
at different hospitals in their choice set in the future, thereby affecting their current choice.
Both sources of demand inertia create a link between the choices patients make at different
points in time. If the choices patients make are intertemporally linked, these choices will be af-
fected by whether or not patients anticipate the future, as well as the degree of sophistication of
their foresight — what we refer to as patient expectations. If patient preferences were completely
independent across time and switching costs inexistent, meaning that there would be no intertem-
poral link, current choices would be unaffected by whether and how patients anticipate future ones.
In other words, the role of patient expectations and demand inertia are inextricable.
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In the present paper we analyse a hospital market where switching costs and persistent hori-
zontal patient preferences generate demand inertia and investigate how different types of patient
expectations affect quality provision by two competing hospitals. In the context of patient choice
of hospital, rational expectations imply that patients take the future into account and are able to
correctly assess the evolution of the determinants of their choices. In our framework more specif-
ically, where demand inertia is present, forward-looking and rational patients know that they will
demand hospital care in the future with some positive probability, anticipate that their preferences
may change over time, are aware of the lock-in effect of switching costs, and foresee future qual-
ity. Regarding the latter aspect, these patients not only know that higher quality attracts higher
demand in the present and that part of this demand will be locked-in, but also predict how this
locked-in demand affects future quality. In turn, understanding the link between current and future
quality, via demand, requires some knowledge of hospital objectives and technology.
Departures from fully rational behaviour may occur because patients are present-biased or
because they have incorrect beliefs about the link between current and future quality (Baicker et
al., 2015). We look at present-bias by considering myopic patients, who ignore the future and base
their choice of hospital on current observable variables only. We also look at incorrect beliefs about
future quality by allowing for the possibility that patients are forward-looking but näıve. In this
case, the difference from full rationality lies not on whether patients anticipate the future but on
how they do it. Similarly to forward-looking and rational patients, forward-looking but näıve ones
anticipate the possibility of having persistent preferences and the existence of switching costs. They
fail, however, in foreseeing future quality. Because predicting the evolution of hospital quality is
cognitively complex or because the information required to carry out such a task is unavailable,
these patients are näıve in the sense that they resort to the simple rule-of-thumb of expecting that
quality will remain constant.
To study the demand for hospital care when there is inertia, we present a two-period model
where patients choose a hospital based on the level of quality offered, their horizontal preferences,
and, possibly, a switching cost. In the second period, patients who remain in the market either
have new or the same preferences as in the first period and incur a switching cost if they decide to
demand treatment from the hospital they did not choose previously. In the first period, all patients
are new in the market, implying that there are no switching costs and that horizontal preferences
affect first-period utility only to the extent that they represent contemporaneous tastes. If patients
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are forward-looking, however, their choices are also conditioned on what might happen in the
second period; namely, the possibility that their preferences may change and that they might want
to switch (i.e., patients may see themselves tied to the ‘wrong’ hospital) and the evolution of
the quality difference between the two hospitals. It is, therefore, in the first period that patient
expectations play a role in determining the demand for hospital care and hence in affecting the
incentives for quality provision.
To make the analysis of the evolution of quality more comprehensive, we assume that the
hospitals are motivated and allow for both cost substitutability and complementarity between
quality and output in hospital production. If the degree of cost substitutability is sufficiently
strong, higher demand increases the marginal cost of quality provision. This, in turn, implies that
higher quality in the present foretells lower quality in the future or, more specifically, that a current
unilateral quality increase reduces the future quality difference. A current unilateral quality increase
yields a demand advantage, which, owing to inertia, partially carries over into the future, increasing
the marginal cost of quality and thus reducing the incentives for quality provision. Similarly, if
there is cost complementarity (or if the degree of cost substitutability is sufficiently weak), higher
demand reduces the marginal cost of quality and implies that a current unilateral quality increase
widens both the current and the future quality differences.1 This link between present and future
quality, and the fact that only rational patients observe it, partly explain our results.
We show that patient expectations affect quality provision only through the responsiveness of
demand to quality, with higher responsiveness leading to higher quality provision. While demand
is always more responsive when patients are forward-looking but näıve than when patients are
myopic, demand responsiveness under rational expectations depends on the actual relationship
between present and future quality. The more rational patients anticipate a current quality increase
to be offset (or more than offset) in terms of the future quality difference, the less attracted by
it these patients are. This is why demand responsiveness to quality is decreasing (increasing) in
the degree of cost substitutability (complementarity) when patients are rational. Consequently,
demand responsiveness and quality under rational expectations are ranked highest, lowest, or in
between the cases of forward-looking but näıve and myopic expectations, depending on the degree
of cost substitutability/complementarity.
1In this case, naturally, the lower the degree of cost complementarity is or the higher the degree of cost substi-
tutability is, the smaller is the magnitude of the increase in the future quality difference caused by a current quality
increase.
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This first main result has important implications for patient welfare. In a symmetric equilibrium,
the type of which we focus our analysis on, expectations affect aggregate patient utility uniquely
through quality. Thus, when we rank quality according to the type of expectations, we are also
raking patient welfare. This implies that full rationality does not necessarily make patients better
off.
Our second main result relates to the effect of demand inertia on quality provision and its
connection with patient expectations. We show that, compared with the benchmark of a market
without demand inertia, quality provision is determined by two additional effects. First, there is
a pro-quality effect of competition for market share, because current demand is valuable in the
future and will be partially locked-in. Second, there is a patient foresight effect, capturing the
size of demand responsiveness under the different types of patient expectations relative to the
benchmark. The foresight effect vanishes when patients are myopic and reinforces the competition
effect when they are forward-looking but näıve. It may instead outweigh the competition effect
if patients foresee that a unilateral quality increase will yield a sufficiently large reduction in the
future quality difference. Rational expectations and strong cost substitutability are, therefore,
necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for demand responsiveness to be low enough to dominate
the competition effect and quality to be lower than in a market without inertia.
The intuition behind our third and final result mirrors that which we have just described. We
look at the outcome of a policy aimed at reducing inertia and show that lower switching costs
are generally counterproductive. Lower switching costs reduce the competition effect and thus can
only lead to higher quality if they increase demand responsiveness to the extent that it more than
compensates for that reduction. This turns out to be the case only when patients are rational
and a unilateral quality increase today causes a sufficiently large reduction in the future quality
difference.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we relate our study to several
strands of literature. In Section 3, we present the model and, in Section 4, derive the equilibrium
quality levels in the two-period game. Our primary analysis is given in sections 5, 6, and 7, where we
explore the role of patient expectations thoroughly, compare quality provision with the benchmark
of a market without demand inertia, and investigate the effect of lower switching costs. Finally, as
well as concluding remarks, Section 8 provides a discussion of the implications of forward-looking
and rational behaviour to patient welfare.
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2 Related literature
The recent empirical literature that documents choice persistence in the hospital industry motivates
our study. Jung et al. (2011) estimate that the probability of a hospital being chosen for a
hypothetical hospitalisation is 64 percentage points higher if the hospital was previously used,
and Shepard (2016) finds that patients are five times more likely to choose a hospital where they
received outpatient care in the previous year. Two subsequent studies corroborate these results and
show that demand inertia results from both switching costs (or state dependence) and persistent
patient preferences (or unobserved patient heterogeneity). Raval and Rosenbaum (2018) report
that previous use increases the predicted share of women expected to return to a hospital for
childbirth from 40% to 72%. Additionally, they show that the effect of previous utilisation, the
switching cost, falls in magnitude but is statistically robust to the inclusion of hospital-patient
fixed effects, which capture the effect of persistent preferences. More specifically, they estimate
that the effect of switching costs accounts for roughly 40% of demand inertia. Irace (2018) resorts
to quasi-exogenous shocks that induce patients to switch hospitals. He finds that patients admitted
at a hospital they have never visited before during an emergency are more likely to return to that
hospital in subsequent episodes of care. This is indicative of switching costs and is also true for
patients forced to try a new hospital during a temporary closure because of a natural disaster.
Conversely, patients who do return to the hospital they had been using before the emergency are
more likely to choose it repeatedly, which points to preference persistency.
Much earlier, Klemperer (1987) established a framework to analyse price competition in markets
with switching costs where some patients have persistent horizontal preferences. One of the key
insights it provides, and that is well-established in the switching costs literature (Villas-Boas, 2015),
is that rational consumers’ realisation that a higher price in the future follows a lower price in the
present makes demand less elastic, contributing to higher prices. While the analogous result may
be present in our model, it also allows for the possibility that higher quality in the future follows
higher quality in the present. When anticipated by patients, this makes demand more elastic and
reinforces the effect of competition for market share induced by switching costs, leading to higher
quality provision.2
2For example, Klemperer (1987) shows that prices are always above the no-inertia case if consumers are rational
and all of those who bought in the first period have unchanged preferences. In our model, however, under the same
conditions, quality provision may be higher than in a market without demand inertia owing to the relationship
between hospital technology and motivation.
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In the context of quality competition in primary care, Gravelle and Masiero (2000) present
a two-period model where myopic patients incur switching costs. Contrary to our results, they
show that quality is unaffected by switching costs. Within the hospital competition literature, two
studies consider an information-related form of inertia. Arising from the complexity of assessing
the quality of care, demand sluggishness implies that, at each point in time, only a fraction of
patients become aware of quality changes and hence only a fraction of any potential change in
demand materialises. Weaker sluggishness, therefore, makes demand more responsive to quality.
With profit-maximising providers and a positive payment-cost margin, as in Brekke et al. (2012),
increased demand responsiveness leads to higher quality. Siciliani et al. (2013), however, show
that semi-altruistic hospital preferences may overturn this result. Increased demand responsive-
ness leads to lower quality provision if the prospective payment is sufficiently below unit costs and
the financial incentive to avoid patients dominates the altruistic incentive to attract them.3 Al-
though demand responsiveness to quality also plays a crucial role in our model, our analysis differs
significantly from those of Brekke et al. (2012) and Siciliani et al. (2013). First, they model inertia
in a multiperiod framework where expectations are unexplored. Second, they focus on exogenous
changes in parameters that affect demand responsiveness and on how this, in turn, impacts quality
provision, given hospital preferences and technology. Here, we mainly investigate how patient ex-
pectations determine demand responsiveness endogenously and show that hospital preferences and
technology may themselves affect demand responsiveness.
To the best of our knowledge, no study has explored the link between patient expectations and
choice of provider. There is, however, a growing empirical literature on healthcare utilisation under
nonlinear health insurance contracts, which sheds light on whether consumers take the future into
account in the broader healthcare context. Brot-Goldberg et al. (2017) study healthcare utilisation
by employees who were required to switch from free full-coverage to a nonlinear, high-deductible
insurance plan. They report that annual utilisation decreases by 17.9% in response to the plan
change, and, importantly, it does so almost entirely while consumers are still under the deductible
(i.e., before coinsurance eligibility). This result holds even for the sickest of consumers, who should
anticipate reaching the coinsurance arm of the plan with near certainty and thus face lower end-
of-year prices. Guo and Zhang (2019) show that, during the year of childbirth, fathers’ monthly
medical care utilisation rises by 11% upon becoming eligible for coinsurance, despite childbirth being
3Brekke et al. (2011) investigate this mechanism thoroughly. For an overview of the literature on quality
competition in healthcare markets, see Brekke et al. (2014).
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an expected event that contributes a great deal to deductible fulfilment. Absent liquidity constraints
and controlling for health shocks, these fluctuations in healthcare utilisation are consistent with
some degree of myopic behaviour since a fully forward-looking consumer would respond to his
expected end-of-year price rather than to the spot price, thereby smoothing consumption over the
year. Myopic behaviour instead implies that consumers perceive changes in coverage as changes
in prices and hence adjust consumption accordingly. Dalton et al. (2020) provide even stronger
evidence of myopic behaviour. They find that consumers completely ignore the future prices of
prescription drugs under Medicare Part D, whose nonlinear contract design includes an initial
coverage region followed by a coverage gap (the ‘doughnut hole’). Drug purchases are initially
constant and drop sharply once the coverage gap is reached, implying an estimated discount rate
that is consistent with full myopia (i.e., equal to zero). A similar pattern of drug consumption
under Medicare Part D may be found in Sacks et al. (2017), Einav et al. (2015), and Abaluck et
al. (2018). In the latter two studies, however, the estimated discount rates indicate some degree
of forward-looking behaviour, which is considerably higher in Einav et al. (2015). Additional
evidence of forward-looking behaviour comes from Aron-Dine et al. (2015). They find that initial
medical care utilisation is lower for employees who join a health insurance plan with an annual
deductible later in the year. Because their deductible is less likely to be reached, individuals who
enrol later face a higher expected end-of-year price. Their lower initial utilisation under the plan,
therefore, suggests that they do respond to future prices. Interestingly, Aron-Dine et al. (2015) find
similar results for prescription drug consumption under Medicare Part D. Looking at the German
public health insurance system, Farbmacher et al. (2017) also report evidence of forward-looking
behaviour. After the introduction of a one-time co-payment, initial outpatient care demand falls
for some consumers, while it is unresponsive for the relatively sick, who should expect future needs
to exceed a single visit and thus be less sensitive to the co-payment.
3 The model
Consider a health care market with two providers, henceforth referred to as hospitals. In each of
two periods, t = 1, 2, the two hospitals, indexed i = A,B, are located at either endpoint of the
unit line segment [0, 1]. Let Hospital A be located at 0 and Hospital B at 1. Locations on the line
segment reflect the characteristics and preferences for elective hospital treatment supplied in this
market. The line segment may be thought of as a geographical space or a disease space. In the
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former case, a patient’s location on the line is simply her residence or workplace, while the location
of a hospital is simply the place where its facilities were built. In the latter case, a patient’s location
on the line is a medical condition or a diagnosis, and the location of a hospital is the speciality mix
(i.e., the treatments and services) it offers.
Patients have a gross valuation of treatment v > 0, demand a single unit of treatment from one
of the hospitals in each period, and are arrayed with unit density along the line segment. They incur
a travelling or mismatch cost τ per unit of distance between their location and that of the chosen
hospital, but bear no out-of-pocket expenses either due to public provision of healthcare or to
(social or private) health insurance coverage.4 Patients derive utility from the quality of treatment,
qit, to which hospitals resort to attract demand in each period. There is a lower bound on treatment
quality that represents the minimum quality hospitals are allowed to offer, with quality below this
threshold being interpreted as malpractice. For simplicity, we assume that the lower bound on
quality is equal to zero. The gross valuation of treatment v is high enough so that the market is
always fully covered.
Following the empirical analyses of Raval and Rosenbaum (2018) and Irace (2018), we model
demand inertia in the style of Klemperer (1987). In the first period, all patients are new in the
market, meaning that no patient is tied to any of the hospitals. Patients choose a hospital based
on their horizontal preferences and the quality levels offered in the market. In the second period, a
fraction λ of the patients leave the market and are replaced by new patients with the same density
and who are also uniformly distributed along the unit line segment. Another fraction µ of the
existing patients have preferences for treatment characteristics that are independent of their first-
period preferences. These patients are uniformly distributed along [0, 1] and may be interpreted
as patients who now reside or work in a different place or patients who have developed another,
unrelated, disease. The parameter µ may, therefore, be interpreted as an inverse measure of the
persistence of patient preferences over time. Patients with changing preferences who choose to
demand treatment from the hospital they have not used in the first period incur an exogenous
switching cost s. The remaining (1 − λ − µ) patients have unchanged preferences for treatment
characteristics (i.e., their location on the line segment equals the first-period location) and choose
the same hospital in both periods.5 Thus, we measure demand inertia in two different ways: the
4The latter feature is analytically equivalent to having hospitals charge the same regulated price.
5As Villas-Boas (2015) suggests, this could be explicitly modelled by adding an infinitely high switching cost for
these patients.
9
cost of switching providers (s) and the persistence of patient preferences (1− λ− µ).
In the first period, patients know that they will leave the market with probability λ, have
different preferences in the second period with probability µ, and have persistent preferences with
the remaining probability 1−λ−µ. These probabilities are independent of the first-period choice of
hospital. Under these assumptions, the utility, in period t, of a patient located at xt who demands
treatment from Hospital i, located at zi, is given by
ut(xt, z
i) = v + qit − τ |xt − zi| − Iis, i, j = A,B; (1)
where Ii = 1 in the second period if the patient has changing preferences, chose Hospital i in the
first period, and chooses Hospital j in the second period; Ii = 0 otherwise.
6
Hospitals are prospectively financed by a third-party payer (e.g., a regulator or insurer) that
offers a price p̃ for each unit of treatment supplied and a lump-sum transfer, T , which ensures that













2, i, j = A,B; i 6= j; (2)
where c ≶ 0 measures either the degree of cost substitutability (if c > 0) or complementarity (if
c < 0) between quality and output, k > max{0,−cqit} is the minimum unit cost of treatment, γ > 0
is a quality investment cost parameter, and Dit is the demand for Hospital i in period t (or the
number of treatments produced).
If c > 0, a certain level of quality is more costly to achieve when more patients are treated,
implying that the marginal cost of quality is increasing in demand. In this case, hospital production
exhibits cost substitutability between quality and output. This is a reasonable assumption if quality
results from the investment in medical equipment and highly skilled staff. For example, offering
an additional diagnostic test amounts to an increase in quality and requires a fixed investment in
equipment and/or staff but also increases the cost of diagnosing each patient. On the other hand,
if c < 0, the more patients a hospital treats, the less costly it is to provide each additional unit of
quality, and the marginal cost of quality is decreasing in demand. In this case, quality and output
are cost complements, reflecting the positive relationship between demand and quality observed
when, all else equal, high-volume hospitals provide higher quality and generate better treatment
6For patients with persistent preferences, x1 = x2.
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outcomes than low-volume hospitals.7
Additionally, we assume that hospitals are motivated in the sense that they care, to some
extent, about the gross utility their patients derive from treatment. Specifically, we assume that
Hospital i ignores the travelling/mismatch and switching costs of its patients but attaches a weight
α > 0, denoting the degree of provider motivation, to the remaining part of their aggregate utility
(v + qit)D
i
t. Per-period payoff of Hospital i is thus given by








+ α(v + qit)D
i
t. (3)
For simplicity and without loss of generality, there is no discounting. Furthermore, whereas hospi-
tals have rational expectations, we allow for different types of patient expectations, which will be
detailed later.
Finally, we impose the following restriction on parameter values:







This restriction ensures that the second-order condition of the hospitals’ maximisation problems in
the second period and in a market without demand inertia are satisfied, as well as that the games
we consider have economically meaningful, interior solutions. It simply implies that the degree of
cost substitutability must be sufficiently strong or the degree of cost complementarity sufficiently
weak. Throughout the analysis, we also assume the existence of interior-solution equilibria, i.e.,
qit > 0, which requires that p̃ is sufficiently high.
4 Equilibrium quality provision
In each period, hospitals simultaneously and independently choose quality levels to maximise the
total (present and future) value of a weighted sum of profits and aggregate gross patient utility.
First-period quality levels result in first-period demands, with DA1 + D
B
1 = 1. Second-period
quality levels and payoffs depend on these demands, which fully capture the outcome of the first
period. To take into account this dependence, we solve the game backwards for a pure-strategy
7These positive returns to hospital volume are generally attributed to learning-by-doing or quality-enhancing
scale economies, which capture the idea that healthcare providers become increasingly efficient as the number of




4.1 The second period
Consider the different groups of patients in turn. A fraction λ of patients were not in the market in
the first period and are not therefore tied to any of the hospitals. The new patient who is indifferent








Hospitals A and B serve respectively λx̂ and λ(1 − x̂) of these patients. Additionally, Hospital A
serves all of these patients if qA2 > q
B




2 − τ .
A fraction µDA1 of patients sought treatment from Hospital A in the first period and now
have preferences for treatment characteristics that are uniformly distributed along the line segment
[0, 1]. The patient who was previously treated at Hospital A and is now indifferent between seeking





qA2 − qB2 + s
2τ
. (6)
Hospitals A and B serve respectively µDA1 x̂|A and µD
A
1 (1 − x̂|A) of these patients. Additionally,
Hospital A serves all of these patients if qA2 > q
B
2 + τ − s and none if qA2 < qB2 − τ − s.
Similarly, a fraction µDB1 of patients sought treatment from Hospital B in the first period
and now have preferences for treatment characteristics that are uniformly distributed along the
line segment [0, 1]. The patient who was previously treated at Hospital B and is now indifferent





qA2 − qB2 − s
2τ
. (7)
Hospitals A and B serve respectively µDB1 x̂|B and µD
B
1 (1 − x̂|B) of theses patients. Additionally,
Hospital A serves all of these patients if qA2 > q
B




2 − τ + s.
Finally, the remaining fractions (1 − λ − µ)DA1 and (1 − λ − µ)DB1 of the patients choose,
respectively, Hospital A and Hospital B in both periods. Combining demand from the three types

















1)s+ (1− λ− µ)D
i
1, i, j = A,B; i 6= j; (8)
provided that |qA2 − qB2 | < τ − s.8

















2, i, j = A,B; i 6= j; (9)









λ+µ − (α− c)
+ (α− c)φDi1, i = A,B, (10)
where
φ :=




λ+µ − 3(α− c)
] > 0. (11)
The parameter restriction given in (4) ensures that the second-order condition is always satisfied,
provided that (8) holds. However, this is insufficient to prove that the pair of strategies (10) define
an equilibrium in the second-period subgame. It must be ensured that hospitals do not deviate
and serve only their captive patients with fixed preferences, thus choosing a quality level outside
the range in which (8) holds. As Klemperer (1987) notes, the deviation is not beneficial if λ + µ
is large enough and the difference between first-period demands is sufficiently small. In the next
section, we show that a symmetric pure-strategy candidate subgame perfect equilibrium exists and
assume λ+ µ is such that it indeed is an equilibrium.
Applying symmetry (DA1 = D
B




λ+µ − (α− c)
. (12)
Before turning to the first-period subgame, one must take into account the inter-period de-
pendence by analysing the effect of first-period demand on second-period payoffs. In a symmetric
8Switching only occurs in equilibrium if s < τ , so that the preferences for treatment characteristics of some
patients outweigh the switching cost.
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[p+ (α− c)q∗2] > 0, i = A,B. (13)
Because the marginal patient is always beneficial to treat in the second period (p+ (α− c)q∗2 > 0),
first-period demand has an unambiguously positive effect on second-period payoffs. This gives
hospitals an additional incentive to invest in quality in the first period and attract demand, since
it will be partially locked-in.
4.2 The first period
Anticipating the effect of first-period quality choices in the second period, hospitals maximise the

























1)], i, j = A,B; i 6= j. (14)









































where i, j = A,B and i 6= j. Applying symmetry and using (13), first-period equilibrium quality,
q∗1, is implicitly defined by
[

















The term in square brackets is the total payoff (present plus future) of treating an additional
patient in the first period, and it is always positive in equilibrium. Because treating an additional
patient is always beneficial, the incentive to invest in quality depends on how strongly first-period
demand responds to quality changes. This response, as we show below, is determined by patient
9To save notation, we omit function arguments whenever there is no ambiguity.
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expectations.




1), be functions of first-period quality levels,
which are observable to patients, and consider the first-period choice of hospital of a patient who is
located at y. In the first period, the patient’s utility from choosing Hospital A is (v+ qA1 − τy). In
the second period, with probability λ, the patient is not in the market and has zero utility. With
probability µ, the patient remains in the market and has preferences for treatment characteristics
uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Conditional on having volatile preferences and choosing Hospital
A in the first period, the patient anticipates that, for a given second-period location x, he will
choose Hospital A in the second period if v + qAE − τx > v + qBE − τ(1 − x) − s; or, equivalently,
if x < 1/2 + (qAE − qBE + s)/2τ . Conversely, the patient anticipates that he will choose Hospital B
and incur the switching cost if x exceeds that threshold. With probability 1 − λ − µ, the patient
has persistent preferences (i.e., he is located at y also in the second period) and will again choose
Hospital A. Then, the expected total utility (first-period utility plus expected second-period utility)
of the patient located at y which results from choosing Hospital A in the first period is























[v + qBE − τ(1− x)− s]dx
+ (1− λ− µ)(v + qAE − τy). (18)










0 (v + q
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[v + qBE − τ(1− x)]dx
+(1−λ−µ)[v+qBE −τ(1−y)]. (19)
Equating (18) and (19) implicitly defines the location of the patient who is indifferent between


















1− λ− µ+ µsτ
2τ(2− λ− µ)
]
(qAE − qBE ) (20)



















, i, j = A,B; i 6= j. (21)
Thus, demand responsiveness to quality in the first period depends in part on patients’ expec-
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tations of how a unilateral quality increase affects the quality difference between the hospitals in
the next period. In the following we will consider three different assumptions regarding patient
expectations:
(i) Myopic patients. If patients are myopic, they fully ignore the second period when making
their first-period choice of hospital. Their decisions are therefore only based on observable
first-period variables (qualities and travelling distance).
(ii) Forward-looking but näıve patients. In this case, patients take the second period into
account when making their first-period choice of hospital, anticipating the lock-in effect of
switching costs and that their preferences may change, but fail to properly assess the evolution
of quality. Specifically, given the complexity of evaluating hospital quality and, in particular,
how future quality depends on current demand and hence quality, näıve patients resort to
the rule-of-thumb of expecting that quality is the same in both periods.
(iii) Forward-looking and rational patients. In this case, patients have rational expectations
and correctly anticipate how quality investments today affect each hospital’s incentives for
quality investments in the future.
5 Patient expectations and quality provision
In this section, we analyse how the different types of patient expectations affect each hospital’s
incentives for quality provision. We do so by deriving the demand responsiveness to quality, (21),
under each of our three assumptions regarding patient expectations. We then proceed by performing
a ranking of equilibrium quality levels based on these expectations. Notice that patient expectations
have no effect on the second-period decisions, which allows us to focus only incentives for quality
provision in the first period.
5.1 Myopic patients
If patients are myopic and ignore the future, demand responsiveness to quality is the same as it
would be if all patients leave the market after the first period (i.e., λ = 1 and µ = 0), which implies










, i, j = A,B; i 6= j. (22)
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Thus, with myopic patients, demand responsiveness to quality is the same as in a static version of
the model and demand inertia plays no role.10
5.2 Forward-looking but näıve patients
If patients expect first-period quality to prevail in the second period, this implies that ∂(qiE −
qjE)/∂q
i















, i, j = A,B; i 6= j. (23)
Compared with the case of myopic patients, the presence of patients with näıve expectations
introduces three additional effects on the demand responsiveness to quality. First, patients antic-
ipate that they will also need treatment in the second period, thus having to ‘travel’ twice. This
makes quality relatively less important than travelling/mismatch costs and leads, all else equal,
to lower demand responsiveness to quality. This effect, however, is counteracted by the effect of
patients’ näıvety, since they expect a marginal change in quality to persist in the future; i.e., the
benefit of higher quality is also ‘counted twice’. In the absence of switching costs, these two effects






1 = 1/2τ if s = 0, regardless of whether patients
are myopic or forward-looking but näıve.
However, the presence of switching costs introduces a third effect that makes demand more
responsive to quality if patients are forward-looking but näıve. More precisely, the presence of
switching costs increases the relative importance of expected quality differences in the future. To
illustrate this mechanism, consider the case of a marginal increase in first-period quality by Hospital
A with qA1 > q
B
1 . While such a quality increase would increase demand for Hospital A, a patient
located sufficiently close to Hospital B would still prefer to remain with that hospital, because the
lower travelling costs outweigh the foregone quality improvement. However, if such a patient is
forward-looking, he anticipates that, with probability µ, his location on the line will not remain the
same in the future, but will be randomly drawn from a uniform distribution. Since the expected
value of a uniform distribution on [0, 1] is 1/2, and since the patient expects that first-period quality
differences will persist in the second period, he consequently expects that, with probability µ, his
preferred choice of hospital in the future will be Hospital A and not Hospital B. However, since
10With myopic patients, although demand inertia plays no role in determining the demand responsiveness to
quality, it still plays a role in determining the hospitals’ incentives for quality provision, as can be seen from (17).
The importance of demand inertia for equilibrium quality provision is analysed in Section 6.
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s > 0 makes it costly to switch from the low-quality to the high-quality hospital in the future,
the patient might find it preferable to choose Hospital A already today, and this choice is more
likely the higher the switching costs. In other words, when patients are näıve and expect quality
differences to persist, the presence of switching costs increases demand responsiveness to quality
because of patients’ fear of being locked-in to the ‘wrong’ hospital in the future.
5.3 Forward-looking and rational patients
If patients have rational expectations, they know that hospitals will set quality according to (10)
and therefore anticipate that the quality difference in the second period will be
qiE − q
j




















, i, j = A,B; i 6= j. (25)




















, i, j = A,B; i 6= j. (26)
Forward-looking and rational patients not only anticipate that they will be (partially or totally)
tied to their first-period hospital but also correctly anticipate how quality investments in the present
affect future quality. This implies that the responsiveness of demand to quality in the first period
depends on two additional factors, namely provider motivation and technology. These two factors
determine the relationship between demand and the marginal cost of quality provision for each
hospital. More specifically, higher demand increases (reduces) the marginal cost of quality provision
if c > (<)α. Under rational expectations, this has important implications for how a change
in the current quality difference between hospitals informs patients’ beliefs about future quality
differences. From (25) we see that a unilateral quality increase by Hospital i will increase the
expected quality difference between Hospital i and Hospital j in the future only if α > c, and
11Positive demand responsiveness requires that















monotonically increasing in α and monotonically decreasing in c, it follows from (21) that the
demand responsiveness to quality is also monotonically increasing in α and monotonically decreasing
in c.
In order to illustrate the above stated mechanism, consider for example the case of profit-
oriented hospitals and cost substitutability between quality and output, which implies c > α = 0.
In this case, if patients observe a unilateral quality increase by, say, Hospital A, they will rationally
expect that the resulting shift in demand from Hospital B to Hospital A is going to increase the
marginal cost of quality provision for Hospital A and reduce it for Hospital B, thus resulting in
a weakening of Hospital A’s incentives for quality provision in the future, and a corresponding
strengthening of Hospital B’s future incentives for quality provision, all else equal. Such expecta-
tions will make patients more reluctant to switch from Hospital B to Hospital A following a quality
increase by the latter hospital, thus reducing the demand responsiveness to quality. The opposite
logic obviously applies if c < α.
Notice, however, that demand responsiveness with rational patients may be lower than with
myopic patients, even in the case where higher demand reduces the marginal cost of quality provision
(i.e., c < α). In other words, patients may correctly anticipate that a marginal increase in the
quality of Hospital i will increase the future quality difference and still be less attracted by that
increase than they would if they were myopic and ignored the future. A necessary condition for
this to happen is that patients expect that the quality advantage of Hospital i will decrease over






/∂qi1 < 1, which implies that quality becomes relatively less important
than travelling/mismatch costs for forward-looking patients.12
5.4 The effect of patient expectations on equilibrium quality
We are now ready to summarise the effect of patient expectations on equilibrium quality provision.
From (17), we know that equilibrium quality is increasing in demand responsiveness and that this
is the only channel through which patient expectations influence quality provision. Therefore, to
establish under which type of expectations quality is higher, it suffices to compare the magnitudes
of the demand responsiveness. We have shown that demand is more responsive to quality when
12Recall that forward-looking patients anticipate that theyy may have to ‘travel’ twice, which makes quality
relatively less important than travelling/mismatch costs and contributes to lower demand responsiveness. Only if the
future quality difference is sufficiently large, will demand responsiveness be higher than when patients are myopic.
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patients are forward-looking but näıve than when patients are myopic, implying that quality is
higher in the former case.
Depending on how much a first-period quality increase is offset in the second period, demand
responsiveness (and hence quality) when patients are rational may be lower than when patients are
myopic, higher than when patients are näıve, or lie in between. Recall that, with rational patients,
demand responsiveness is monotonically decreasing in c. If a first-period quality increase has no
effect on the expected second-period quality difference (i.e., if c = α), demand responsiveness
is lower with forward-looking and rational patients than if patients are either myopic or näıve.
Demand will be more responsive to quality under rational expectations only if a current unilateral
quality increase produces a sufficiently large increase in the future expected quality difference
between the hospitals. This requires sufficiently weak cost substitutability (or sufficiently strong
cost complementarity).
The above analysis is summarised as follows.
Proposition 1 (i) If patients are forward-looking but näıve, equilibrium quality is always higher
than if patients are myopic. (ii) Provided that the cost function is sufficiently convex in quality, if
patients are forward-looking and rational, equilibrium quality is
1. higher than if patients are näıve if






(2−λ−µ) + 3(λ+ µ)
; (27)
2. lower than if patients are myopic if




(1−λ−µ) + 3(λ+ µ)
; (28)
where max{cmin, cR} < c′ < c′′ < α.
Proof. Follows directly from a comparison of (22), (23) and (23). A sufficiently high γ ensures that
the second-order condition in (16) is satisfied for values of c such that the set (max {cmin, cR} , c′)
is non-empty.
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6 The effect of demand inertia on quality provision
In this section, we investigate how demand inertia affects incentives for quality provision. Our
benchmark case of no demand inertia may be derived by setting (i) λ = 0, µ = 1 and s = 0; or (ii)
λ = 1 and µ = 0. Although analytically equivalent, (i) and (ii) have different interpretations. In the
former case, no patient leaves the market and there are no switching costs, but the preferences of
all patients are reshuffled after the first period. In the latter case, all patients are replaced between
periods, and hence there is no switching. In either case, there is no interaction between periods,
patients’ choices of hospital are independent, and demand is unaffected by expectations. This also
illustrates that the role of patient expectations is unavoidably linked to the presence of demand
inertia. Our choice of benchmark, thus, allows the analysis in this section to be interpreted as an
analysis of the effect of patient expectations relative to a market wherein they play no role.
The first-order condition defining the symmetric equilibrium quality level in a market without
demand inertia is given by
1
2τ
[p+ (α− c)qN ] + α− c
2




2τγ − (α− c)
. (30)
Since the absence of demand inertia implies that equilibrium quality provision is equal in both
periods, it is not immediately clear how a comparison with a model where equilibrium quality
provision might differ over time should be interpreted. However, notice that equilibrium quality
without demand inertia is higher than second-period quality provision in the presence of demand
inertia; i.e., qN > q∗2. Our analytical strategy will therefore be to characterise under which con-
ditions this inequality also holds with respect to first-period quality provision (i.e., qN > q∗1). If
q∗1 < q
N , we can conclude that the presence of demand inertia unambiguously leads to a lower
quality provision.
Comparing the first-order conditions (17) and (30), we see that there are two additional effects
influencing quality provision in a market with demand inertia. First, there is a competition effect,
given by the third term in square brackets on the left-hand side of (17). Since first-period demand is
always valuable in the second period, hospitals have incentives to invest in quality to build market
share. All else equal, the competition effect always leads to higher quality. Second, there is a
patient foresight effect affecting demand responsiveness, which, in turn, determines how effective
21
a quality increase is in attracting demand. In general, the foresight effect may either reinforce or
counteract the competition effect, depending on whether patients’ expectations about the second
period lead to higher or lower demand responsiveness relative to a market without inertia.
Combining the two equilibrium conditions, we obtain, after some manipulations,
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Notice from (21) that demand responsiveness to quality in a market without inertia is equal to
1/2τ . The left-hand side of (31) is monotonic in q∗1 and q
N , and the second-period second-order
condition ensures that the term in square brackets is positive.13 Consequently, q∗1 < q
N if the








(φ/τ)[τγ − (λ+ µ)(α− c)][p+ (α− c)q∗2]
p+ (α− c)qN
. (32)
The above inequality shows that quality is lower than in a market without inertia if the foresight
effect (given by the left-hand side) more than compensates for the competition effect (given by the
right-hand side), which requires that demand responsiveness is sufficiently lower than in a market
without inertia (i.e., sufficiently lower than 1/2τ). More specifically, equilibrium quality is lower
than in the benchmark if the difference in demand responsiveness—which measures the difference in
the effectiveness of a quality increase in attracting patients—exceeds the relative payoff of demand—
which measures how beneficial that increase is in future terms.14
We state the comparison of quality provision between markets with and without demand inertia
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under demand inertia, equilibrium quality is lower than in the benchmark case of
a market without inertia if the following three conditions are all satisfied:
(i) patients are forward-looking and rational,
13Under all of the three types of patient expectations considered, the second-order condition in the first period
simplifies to



















14Notice that by ‘relative payoff of demand’ we refer to the increase in second-period payoffs from treating an
additional patient in the first period expressed in terms of the increase in payoffs from treating an additional patient
in a market without inertia.
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1 is given by (26), and
(iii) the parameters determining the degree of demand inertia satisfy the following condition:
τ (λ+ µ) (τ (1− λ− µ)− 4sµ) + 2sµ (τ + sµ) > 0. (34)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Notice first that the presence of demand inertia can only lead to lower quality provision if
patients have rational expectations. Since myopic patients fully ignore the second period, first-
period demand responsiveness when patients are myopic is the same as in a market without inertia,
which implies that the foresight effect vanishes and quality provision is higher than in the benchmark
due to the competition effect. With forward-looking but näıve patients, demand is more responsive
than in a market without inertia, which implies that the foresight effect is positive and hence
reinforces the competition effect.
Since the demand responsiveness may fall below 1/2τ only in case of rational expectations, this
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for quality to be lower than in the benchmark. According
to Proposition 2, two more conditions are needed. First, the degree of cost substitutability needs to
be sufficiently strong relative to the degree of provider motivation to ensure that the foresight effect
is sufficiently strong (cf. Proposition 1). To grasp why, recall that only if a first-period unilateral
quality increase yields a sufficiently large decrease in the second-period quality difference, will
demand responsiveness be low enough. In addition, the demand inertia parameters need to satisfy
the condition given by (34). It is easily seen that this condition is always satisfied if the switching
costs are sufficiently low (i.e., if s is sufficiently close to zero). Notice that, for c > α, lower switching
costs contribute to reducing both the foresight effect and the competition effect. It reduces the
foresight effect because it reduces the cost of being locked-in to the ‘wrong’ hospital in the second
period, thus increasing the demand responsiveness to quality in the first period. But it also reduces
the competition effect because it weakens the hospitals’ ability to lock in patients by offering higher
quality in the first period. However, it turns out that the reduction in the competition effect is larger
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than the reduction in the foresight effect, which explains why the third condition in Proposition 2
holds for sufficiently low values of s.
7 The effect of switching costs on quality
In this section, we take a more policy-oriented perspective and investigate how expectations affect
the impact on quality of a policy intervention aimed at facilitating switching, which we measure
by a reduction in s. Switching may be facilitated, for example, by the adoption of a market-
wide network of shareable Electronic Health Records, allowing patients to transfer their medical
records between providers easily, or by the publication of quality indicators in the public domain by
regulators, which reduces patients’ uncertainty associated with trying an alternative provider. Since
neither patient expectations nor switching costs affect second-period quality levels in a symmetric
equilibrium, we again focus on the first period.













































λ+µ − 3(α− c)
] > 0. (36)
Lower switching costs generally have a twofold effect on quality. First, because fewer patients will
be locked-in when switching is less costly, lower switching costs reduce the benefit of a marginal
increase in first-period quality in terms of second-period payoffs. Thus, lower switching costs
unambiguously dampen the competition effect, which, all else equal, leads to lower quality. Second,
the effect of lower switching costs on demand responsiveness—and hence on the extent to which
quality is effective in attracting demand—depends on the type of patient expectations. A priori,
these two effects may either reinforce or counteract each other; however, it immediately follows
that lower switching costs will lead to higher quality only if they make demand sufficiently more
elastic.
Myopic patients ignore that they will be (at least partially) locked-in to their first-period
24
provider and only take into account observable variables that affect their first-period utility when
choosing a hospital. This implies that demand responsiveness is unaffected by switching costs and,
in turn, that the change in quality is uniquely determined by the weakened competition effect.
Therefore, lower switching costs unambiguously lead to lower quality when patients are myopic.
While forward-looking but näıve patients anticipate the lock-in effect of switching costs, they
expect quality to remain constant. Since these patients expect a unilateral quality increase to yield
a long-lasting quality difference, the less locked-in they anticipate to be, the less attracted they are
by such an increase. A lower s implies that ‘correcting’ the first-period choice of hospital in the
second period is less costly, which implies that lower switching costs reduce the relative importance
of (present and future) quality differences. In other words, from the perspective of näıve patients,
lower switching costs reduce the benefit of being locked-in to the ‘right’ hospital (cf. Section 5.2).
This leads to lower demand responsiveness and reinforces the effect of the weaker incentives to
invest in quality in terms of second-period payoffs. Thus, lower switching costs also lead to lower
quality when patients are forward-looking but näıve.
When patients have rational expectations, provider motivation and technology again play a
role. More specifically, the effect of switching costs on demand responsiveness depends on whether
a unilateral quality increase today increases or reduces the quality difference in the future, which





























 ≷ 0. (38)
If a first-period quality increase by Hospital i increases the expected quality difference between
Hospital i and Hospital j in the second period (i.e., if c < α), lower switching costs reduce demand
responsiveness. The intuition for this result is similar to that of the case of näıve patients. The less
locked-in patients anticipate to be, the less attracted they are by a quality difference that carries
over into the future, since adjusting their choices in the second period is less costly. Therefore, the
two above-mentioned effects go in the same direction, and lower switching costs again lead to lower
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quality.
If patients instead expect that a marginal increase in first-period quality by Hospital i will be
overturned in the second period, thus leading to a future reduction in the quality difference between
Hospital i and Hospital j, weaker lock-in makes patients more sensitive to quality in the first period.
This happens when c > α. In this case, rational patients know that a first-period quality increase
by one hospital will increase the marginal cost of quality at that hospital, which implies that the
quality difference between the two hospitals will decrease over time. All else equal, when switching
is less costly, patients may take advantage of such differences by choosing the hospital that offers
higher quality in the first period and reversing their choice in the second period at a lower cost.
This is why lower switching costs increase demand responsiveness in the first period, offsetting
the weakened competition effect. If c is initially such that a first-period unilateral quality increase
produces a sufficiently large reduction in the future quality difference, then a reduction in switching
costs increases the patients’ scope for exploiting quality differences to an extent where the increase
in demand elasticity dominates the reduction in the competition effect, leading to an increase in
equilibrium quality provision.
We summarise the above results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Lower switching costs lead to lower quality if patients are myopic or forward-looking
but näıve, but lead to higher quality if patients are rational and the degree of cost substitutability
between quality and output is sufficiently high.
Proof. See Appendix B.
8 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this paper, we argue that demand inertia and patient expectations are inextricable in hospital
markets and investigate their combined effect on quality provision. We start by exploring the
behaviour of three types of patients differing with respect to whether and how they anticipate
the future. Myopic patients ignore the future entirely, forward-looking but näıve patients assume
that hospital quality remains constant over time, whereas forward-looking and rational patients
correctly foresee hospitals’ strategic quality investments. Using this analysis, we show how patient
expectations shape the responsiveness of demand for hospital care to quality and obtain three main
results.
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We find that, unless patients are rational and cost substitutability is sufficiently strong, quality
provision is generally higher than in the benchmark of a market without inertia and, simultaneously,
policies based on switching cost reductions are counterproductive. The co-existence of these two
results is intuitive. If demand inertia leads to higher quality provision, weakening it by reducing
switching costs is an ill-advised policy intervention. A closer inspection of our results, however,
suggests that the link between demand inertia, patient expectations and quality is not that simple.
For some parameter values, demand inertia leads to lower quality and lower switching costs are
nonetheless counterproductive.15 In this case, for intermediate degrees of cost substitutability,
rational patients’ foresight of a reduction in the future quality difference (brought about by a
current unilateral quality increase) makes demand responsiveness low enough to induce hospitals
to offer lower quality than in a market without inertia. This same future reduction in the quality
difference, conversely, does not suffice to persuade patients to take advantage of the present and
future quality differences by reversing their choices if switching costs fall, thereby making demand
sufficiently more responsive and triggering higher quality provision.
It is our first main result, based on a quality ranking, whose implications are more far-reaching.
By ranking quality provision according to the type of patient expectations, we reveal that quality
is always higher when patients are näıve than when they are myopic, while the relative position
of quality when patients are rational ranges from highest to lowest, depending on the hospitals’
technology and motivation. Perhaps surprisingly, these findings are connected to the concept of
‘behaviour hazard’, defined as the misuse of healthcare and the ensuing welfare losses caused by
departures from forward-looking and perfectly rational patient behaviour (Baicker et al., 2015).
Such departures are now well documented in the literature (cf. Section 2), but the evidence on
their impact on patient welfare is less conclusive. The overall reduction in healthcare utilisation
generated by myopic behaviour when compared with fully forward-looking behaviour reported by
Guo and Zhang (2019) is concentrated in elective and preventive care, with emergency care showing
no response. As for the results of Dalton et al. (2020), whereas there is little difference between
fully myopic and fully rational behaviour in terms of quantity, there is a significant change in the
composition of drugs consumed. In conjunction, these pieces of evidence suggest that the effect
of deviations from perfect rationality on patient welfare is generally ambiguous. While we do not
study the misuse of healthcare, we do show that different types of patient expectations provide
15For example, λ = 0.1, µ = 0.4, τ = 0.7, s = 0.5, p = 10, γ = 5, and α = 1.
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contrasting incentives for hospitals to invest in the quality of care, which, in turn, affects patient
welfare. In the symmetric equilibrium of our model, patient expectations affect aggregate patient
utility uniquely through first-period quality. This implies that Proposition 1 is also a ranking of
patient welfare according to the type of expectations and, consequently, that full rationality does
not necessarily lead to better outcomes for patients.
Discussions of the role of rationality commonly focus on the idea that deviations from fully ra-
tional behaviour make consumers act not in their best interest and that firms may find it beneficial
to exploit those deviations. Our results indicate that the reverse might as well hold in hospital mar-
kets. To illustrate this point, suppose first that the degree of cost substitutability/complementarity
is such that a unilateral increase in current quality yields a relatively larger increase in the future






/∂qi1 > 1. In this case, both myopic and näıve patients are less
sensitive to current quality than they would be if they were aware that the larger quality difference
in the present foretells an even larger quality difference in the future. In other words, both myopic
and näıve patients fail to comprehend the true impact of the current unilateral quality increase
on their total utility, which makes demand from these types of patients less responsive to quality.
Hospitals thus exploit the lower demand responsiveness to offer lower quality, and, as expected,
these departures from rationality are detrimental to patient welfare. Conversely, if the degree of
cost substitutability is such that a unilateral increase in current quality yields a reduction in the
future quality difference, myopic and näıve patients are more sensitive to quality than their rational
counterparts. Because rational patients foresee the reduction in the future quality difference and
its effect on their total expected utility, they are less sensitive to quality than they would be if
they ignored the future. Myopic and näıve patients, differently, are oblivious to the future quality
reduction and hence overestimate the impact of the current quality increase on their total utility,
which leads to higher demand responsiveness and induces hospitals to invest in quality. In this
case, therefore, the departures from rationality insulate patients from inferior quality provision by
hindering the hospitals’ ability to exploit the otherwise lower demand responsiveness.
References
[1] Abaluck, J., Gruber, J., and Swanson, A. (2018). Prescription drug use under Medicare
Part D: A linear model of nonlinear budget sets. Journal of Public Economics, 164, 106-138.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.05.005
28
[2] Aron-Dine, A., Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., and Cullen, M. (2015). Moral hazard in health
insurance: Do dynamic incentives matter? The Review of Economics and Statistics, 97(4),
725-741. https://doi.org/10.1162/REST a 00518
[3] Avdic, D., Lundborg, P., and Vikström, J. (2019). Estimating returns to hospital vol-
ume: Evidence from advanced cancer surgery. Journal of Health Economics, 63, 81-99.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.10.005
[4] Baicker, K., Mullainathan, S., and Schwartzstein, J. (2015). Behavioral haz-
ard in health insurance. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(4), 1623-1667.
https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv029
[5] Brekke, K. R., Cellini, R., Siciliani, L., and Straume, O. R. (2012). Competition in regulated
markets with sluggish beliefs about quality. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
21(1), 131-178. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00319.x
[6] Brekke, K. R., Gravelle, H., Siciliani, L., and Straume, O. R. (2014). Patient choice, mobility
and competition among health care providers. In R. Levaggi and M. Montefiori (Eds.), Health
care provision and patient mobility. Developments in health economics and public policy (Vol.
12). Milano: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-5480-6 1
[7] Brekke, K. R., Siciliani, L., and Straume, O. R. (2011). Hospital competition and quality
with regulated prices. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 113 (2), 444-469. https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01647.x
[8] Brot-Goldberg, Z. C., Chandra, A., Handel, B. R., and Kolstad, J. T. (2017). What
does a deductible do? The impact of cost-sharing on health care prices, quanti-
ties, and spending dynamics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(3), 1261-1318.
https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjx013
[9] Dalton, C. M., Gowrisankaran, G., and Town, R. J. (2020). Salience, myopia, and complex
dynamic incentives: Evidence from Medicare Part D. The Review of Economic Studies, 87 (2),
822-869. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz023
29
[10] Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., and Schrimpf, P. (2015). The response of drug expenditure to non-
linear contract design: Evidence from Medicare Part D. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
130(2), 841-899. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv005
[11] Farbmacher, H., Ihle, P., Schubert, I., Winter, J., and Wuppermann, A. (2017). Heterogeneous
effects of a nonlinear price schedule for outpatient care. Health Economics, 26(10), 1234-1248.
https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3395
[12] Gravelle, H., and Masiero, G. (2000). Quality incentives in a regulated market with imperfect
information and switching costs: Capitation in general practice. Journal of Health Economics,
19(6), 1067-1088. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6296(00)00060-6
[13] Guo, A., and Zhang, J. (2019). What to expect when you are expecting: Are
health care consumers forward-looking? Journal of Health Economics, 67, 102216.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2019.06.003
[14] Irace, M. (2018). Patient loyalty in hospital choice: Evidence from New York (Work-
ing Paper No. 2018-52). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3223702
[15] Jung, K., Feldman, R., and Scanlon, D. (2011). Where would you go for
your next hospitalization? Journal of Health Economics, 30(4), 832-841.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.05.006
[16] Klemperer, P. (1987). The competitiveness of markets with switching costs. The RAND Jour-
nal of Economics, 18(1), 138-150. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555540
[17] Raval, D., and Rosenbaum, T. (2018). Why do previous choices matter for hospital demand?
Decomposing switching costs from unobserved preferences. The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 100(5), 906-915. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest a 00741
[18] Sacks, N. C., Burgess Jr., J. F., Cabral, H. J., and Pizer, S. D. (2017). Myopic and forward
looking behavior in branded oral anti-diabetic medication consumption: An example from
Medicare Part D. Health Economics, 26(6), 753-764. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3355
30
[19] Shepard, M. (2016). Hospital network competition and adverse selection: Evidence from the
Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange (Working Paper No. 22600). National Bureau of
Economic Research. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22600
[20] Siciliani, L., Straume, O. R., and Cellini, R. (2013). Quality competition with motivated
providers and sluggish demand. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 37 (10), 2041-
2061. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2013.05.002
[21] Villas-Boas, J. M. (2015). A short survey on switching costs and dynamic
competition. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 32(2), 219-222.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijresmar.2015.03.001
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
The proof that q∗1 > q
N when patients are myopic or forward-looking but näıve follows directly
from equations (22), (23), and (32).
To establish the conditions under which q∗1 < q
N when patients are forward-looking and rational,
we use equations (26) and (30) to rewrite, after some manipulation, condition (32) as
[2τγ − (α− c)] [τγ − (λ+ µ) (α− c)]
1− λ− µ+ µsτ





Let LHS (c) and RHS (c) denote the left-hand and right-hand sides of the above inequality. It is




[1 + 2 (λ+ µ)] τγ − 2 (λ+ µ) (α− c)






(1− λ− µ) (λ+ µ)(
1− λ− µ+ µsτ
)2 [4τγ − 3 (λ+ µ) (α− c)] + 2 [τγ − (λ+ µ) (α− c)] > 0, (A3)
we see that LHS(c) and RHS(c) are strictly increasing in (cmin,∞).
Recall, from condition (32), that LHS(c) < RHS(c) may only hold if ∂Di1/∂q
i
1 < 1/2τ , which,
in turn, requires that c > c′′, with c′′ given by equation (28) in Proposition 1. Then, because
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LHS(c) and RHS(c) are strictly increasing and convex in c,
LHS(c′′)−RHS(c′′) = [2τγ − (α− c
′′)] [τγ − (λ+ µ) (α− c′′)]






1− λ− µ+ µsτ
)2
> 0. (A5)
LHS(c) < RHS(c) may only be true if c exceeds some unique threshold value in (α,∞) and
∂2LHS (c) /∂c2 < ∂2RHS (c) /∂c2, which is true if the condition in (34) holds. The above men-
tioned threshold value is the unique solution to LHS(c) = RHS(c) in (cmin,∞).
Finally, note from (A1) that this solution is independent of p, as well as that q∗t > 0 if p is
sufficiently high. Thus, the set of values of c such that q∗1 < q
N is non-empty and the symmetric
pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is characterised by an interior solution if p is
sufficiently high.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3
The proof that ∂q∗1/∂s > 0 when patients are myopic or forward-looking but näıve follows directly
from (35), given (22), (23), and (36).
To prove that ∂q∗1/∂s < 0 if c is sufficiently high and patients are forward-looking and rational
in an interior solution, we proceed in two steps: (i) we prove that positive equilibrium quality in
the second-period subgame ensures that first-period equilibrium quality is also positive; (ii) we
prove that there is a set of values of c such that ∂q∗1/∂s < 0 and equilibrium quality is positive in
both periods provided that p is sufficiently high.
Combining the first-order conditions defining first- and second-period equilibrium qualities and
rearranging yields
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The left-hand side of (B1) is monotonic in q∗1 and q
∗
2, and the second-period second-order condition
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The above inequality is clearly satisfied under myopic and näıve patient expectations. Recall that
∂Di1/∂q
i
1 > 1/2τ under these two types of expectations and that the expression on the right-hand
side of (B2) is always positive.
Using (26), (B2) is satisfied under rational expectations if





1− λ− µ+ µsτ
)
− (λ+ µ)(2− λ− µ)
1 + 23
(




− (λ+ µ)(2− λ− µ)
]
(B3)
The term in square brackets is greater than 1, implying that the expression on the right-hand




2 ∀ c >
cmin =⇒ (q∗2 > 0 =⇒ q∗1 > 0). This concludes the proof of (i).
Notice now that, given the second-period second-order condition and that ∂Di1/∂q
1
i > 0 for
c > cR, the sign of ∂q
∗
1/∂s is uniquely determined by the sign of the last factor (in square brackets)
in (38), which we now denote by σ. In addition, note that σ < 0 only holds for c > α, given that,
from the first-order condition defining first-period equilibrium quality, γq∗1 − (α− c)/2 > 0.













































Since q∗1 is strictly increasing in p, it follows that limc→c̃− σ < 0 and hence limc→c̃−(∂q
∗
1/∂s) < 0
if p is sufficiently high. Then, by continuity of ∂q∗1/∂s in c, there exists a non-empty set of values
33
of c contained in (α, c̃) such that ∂q∗1/∂s < 0 and the symmetric pure strategy subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium is characterised by an interior solution if p is sufficiently high.
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